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A CLASS OF STOCHASTIC GAMES WITH INFINITELY
MANY INTERACTING AGENTS RELATED TO GLAUBER
DYNAMICS ON RANDOM GRAPHS
EMILIO DE SANTIS AND CARLO MARINELLI
Abstract. We introduce and study a class of infinite-horizon non-
zero-sum non-cooperative stochastic games with infinitely many in-
teracting agents using ideas of statistical mechanics. First we show, in
the general case of asymmetric interactions, the existence of a strat-
egy that allows any player to eliminate losses after a finite random
time. In the special case of symmetric interactions, we also prove
that, as time goes to infinity, the game converges to a Nash equilib-
rium. Moreover, assuming that all agents adopt the same strategy,
using arguments related to those leading to perfect simulation algo-
rithms, spatial mixing and ergodicity are proved. In turn, ergodicity
allows us to prove “fixation”, i.e. that players will adopt a constant
strategy after a finite time. The resulting dynamics is related to zero-
temperature Glauber dynamics on random graphs of possibly infinite
volume.
1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to study a class of stochastic games with infinitely
many interacting agents that is closely connected with a Glauber-type non-
Markovian dynamics on random graphs. Let us briefly explain the setting
and our contributions both from the point of view of game theory and of
physics, referring to the next section for a precise construction of the model.
Our central results are theorems 1, 2 and 3 below.
We consider an infinite number of agents located on the vertices of the
two-dimensional lattice, where each agent is randomly linked with others,
and has positive or negative feelings regarding them. Moreover, each agent
is faced with the need of taking decisions that affect himself and all others to
whom he is linked. The objective of each agent is to take (non-cooperative)
decisions that ultimately do not affect him negatively. Under a specific
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choice of the payoff function of each player, we shall prove that there exists
a decision policy achieving this goal, and even more, that if each player
adopts this strategy a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is reached.
From the physical point of view, we study a Glauber-type dynamics on a
random graph with the following features: the dynamics is non-Markovian
and has long-range interactions, in the sense that the maximum distance
between interacting particles is unbounded. For such dynamics we prove
spatial mixing (hence ergodicity) and fixation. To the best of our knowl-
edge, these problems are solved here for the first time, even in the simpler
case of a standard Glauber dynamics on random graphs. Problems of dy-
namics on random graphs have attracted a lot of attention in recent years
(see the monograph [4] for an extensive overview), as these structures are
often more realistic models of several phenomena than classical determin-
istic structures (e.g. in network modeling, spread of epidemics, opinion
formation, etc.). For instance, C. Cooper and A. M. Frieze [2] prove the
existence of a critical coupling parameter at which the mixing time for the
Swendsen-Wang process on random graphs of sufficiently high density is
exponential in the number of vertices; M. Dyer and A. Frieze [5] study the
rapid mixing (in time) of Glauber dynamics on random graphs with average
degree satisfying a certain condition (see also A. Frieze and V. Juan [8] for
a related result). In J. P. L. Hatchett et al. [10], the authors analyze the
dynamics of finitely connected disordered Ising spin models on random con-
nectivity graph, focusing on the thermodynamic limit. I. Pe´rez Castillo and
N. S. Skantzos [17] study the Hopfield model on a random graph in scaling
regimes with finite average number of connections per neuron and spin dy-
namics as in the Little-Hopfield model. On the other hand, as mentioned
above, even though (spatial) mixing is one of the most natural questions
to ask about stochastic models of interacting particle systems, it has not
been discussed in the literature, to the best of our knowledge. It is probably
important to recall that mixing is a key ingredient to obtain further results,
such as ergodicity. Moreover, just to cite another important application,
using Stein’s methods (see e.g. [1]), mixing implies the central limit the-
orem, which gives qualitative estimates on the number of sites (or agents)
with a positive spin (or opinion) in large regions of the graph.
We would like to stress that our results on mixing are quite general,
and if one is only interested in the physical aspect of our work, they could
essentially skip the part of the paper which deals with stochastic games,
and concentrate only on the physical aspect.
Let us briefly discuss how the model and results of the present paper
are related to the existing literature on using methods of the theory of
interacting particle systems in economic modelling and game theory. One of
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the first and still most cited works on the subject is a paper by H. Fo¨llmer
[6], who considered a pure exchange economy with (countably) infinitely
many agents, each of which having random preferences and endowments.
In particular, agents are located on the vertices of the d-dimensional lattice
Zd, and their preferences can be influenced by all his neighbors (i.e. such
that their euclidean distance is one). The author then considers the problem
of existence of a price system stabilizing the economy. See also E. Nummelin
[16] for further results in this connection, but with a finite number of agents.
In U. Horst and J. Scheinkman [12] the authors study a system of social
interactions where agents are located on the nodes of a subset of Zd, and
each of them is provided with a utility function and a set of feasible actions.
The behavior of an agent is assumed to depend on the choices of other agents
in a reference group, which can be random and unbounded. The authors,
in analogy to our case, work under the assumption that the probability of
two agents being linked decays with distance, and are concerned with the
existence of equilibrium (in the classical microeconomic sense). U. Horst [11]
determines conditions such that non-zero-sum discounted stochastic games
with agents interacting locally and weakly enough have a Nash equilibrium.
While the set of feasible actions in this paper is much richer than in ours,
we do not assume to have any knowledge on the reference group of each
agent, apart of being finite almost surely. We only allow agents to be able
to observe the dynamics of a (local) configuration around them. As a result
of the structural differences in the settings, the optimal strategy in [11] is
Markovian, while in our case it can never be Markovian.
In general, the following features of our setting and results could be par-
ticularly interesting from a game-theoretic perspective: we consider games
where interactions among agents are not known a priori, and we explicitly
construct a strategy that leads the game to equilibrium, while the typical
result of game theory is the existence of equilibrium and a characterization
of optimal strategies at equilibrium.
Let us also briefly recall that several other models of interacting parti-
cle systems admit a natural interpretation in terms of social interaction.
Well-known examples are the voter process (see e.g. T. Liggett [13]), used
in models for the formation and spread of opinions, or the Sherrington-
Kirkpatrick model of spin glasses (see e.g. section 2.1 in M. Talagrand
[18]). Infinite interacting particle systems have found applications in soci-
ology as well: see, for instance, T. Liggett and S. Rolles [14] for a model of
formation of social networks.
The organization of the paper is as follows: in section 2 we describe the
model so we show how agents interact and what their aim is; in section 3
a general strategy achieving the goal of each agent is given, and section 4
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proves spatial mixing, hence ergodicity, of the dynamics, when all agents
adopt the same strategy. Finally, using the results on spatial mixing and
ergodicity, we prove that the game “fixates”, i.e. that agents will adopt a
constant strategy after a finite time. This phenomenon is reminiscent of the
fixation of zero-temperature dynamics (see e.g. E. De Santis and C. M. New-
man [3], L. R. Fontes [7], O. Ha¨ggstro¨m [9], S. Nanda, C. M. Newman and
D. L. Stein [15]).
2. Model and problem formulation
Let us first introduce some notation used throughout the paper. We
consider the two-dimensional lattice Z2 with sites x = (x1, x2) and distance
d defined by
(1) d(x, y) = |x1 − y1|+ |x2 − y2|.
The cardinality of a subset Γ ⊆ Z2 is denoted by |Γ|. We denote by ΛM
the set of all x ∈ Z2 such that d(O, x) ≤ M , with O = (0, 0). If x ∈ Z2,
ΛM (x) stands for ΛM + x. Our configuration space is S = {−1,+1}Z2 .
The single spin space {−1,+1} is endowed with the discrete topology, and
S with the corresponding product topology. Given η ∈ S, or equivalently
η : Z2 → {−1,+1}, and Λ ⊆ Z2, we denote by ηΛ the restriction of η to Λ.
Given a graph G = (V,E), where V and E are the sets of its vertices and
edges, respectively, we shall denote by {x, y} an element of E connecting x,
y ∈ V . For any x ∈ V , we shall denote by ρx the distance of the longest
edge having x as endpoint, namely we define
ρx = sup
y: {x,y}∈E
d(x, y).
Recall that the distance in variation of two probability measures µ and ν
on a discrete set Ω is defined as
‖µ− ν‖ = 1
2
∑
ω∈Ω
|µ(ω)− ν(ω)|.
We shall now introduce an idealized model of a large ensemble of inter-
acting individuals. The ingredients will be a random graph, a function on
its edges (specifying an environment, roughly speaking), and a stochastic
process with values in S describing the time evolution of the system.
Let G = (V,E) be a random graph, whose set of vertices V is given by all
sites of the 2-dimensional lattice Z2, and whose set of edges E satisfy the
following conditions: edges exist with probability one between each site x
and all y such that d(x, y) = 1, and
(2) P(|{y : {x, y} ∈ E}| <∞) = 1 ∀x ∈ V.
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We suppose that each site is occupied by an individual (we shall often
identify individuals with the sites they occupy, when no confusion will arise),
and that relations among individuals are modeled by the edges of G and by
a function j : V × V → {−1, 0,+1}; j(x, y) = 0 if {x, y} /∈ E, otherwise
j(x, y) ∈ {−1,+1}.
In particular, we shall say that individuals x and y are linked if {x, y} ∈
E, and the value j(x, y) shall account for the “feelings” of x towards y: we
set j(x, y) = +1 if x is a “friend” of y, and j(x, y) = −1 if x is an “enemy” of
y. We do not assume symmetry of j, i.e. friendship of an individual towards
another may not be reciprocal. Moreover, we assume that individuals do
not know with whom they are connected, nor whether these individuals are
friends or enemies. Note also that in this model x can be friend of y, y
friend of z, but x and z can be either friends or enemies (a phenomenon
also called frustration in physics).
Let us now introduce a stochastic process σ : [0,∞) → S modelling the
evolution of the “action” (or opinion) of the individuals. We shall use a
graphical construction of the process, which provides a specific version of
basic coupling, i.e. it provides versions of the whole family of stochastic
processes on G (or on any finite subset of it), all on the same probability
space. We assume that the initial configuration σ0 is chosen from a sym-
metric Bernoulli product measure. Moreover, the continuous-time dynamics
of σt is given by independent Poisson processes (with rate 1) at each site
x ∈ V corresponding to those times (tx,n)n∈N when the individual x is asked
to update his opinion. Before describing the set of feasible ways of opinion
updating, let us introduce a reward for a generic individual x at time tx,n,
as a result of his action:
ht(x) = sgn
 ∑
y: {x,y}∈E
j(x, y)σt(x)σt(y)
 ,
where we have set, for simplicity, t ≡ tx,n.
We allow x to base his decision on the history of σΞs(s), s ≥ 0, and
h(x), where Ξs are finite balls centered in x with random radius which is
nondecreasing with respect to s, finite almost surely for all s ≥ 0, and
not ’exploding’. Formally, the decision of individual x at time tx,n is a
{−1,+1}-valued random variable ux,n measurable with respect to the σ-
algebra generated by {σΞs(s), s ≤ tx,n} and {hs(x), s ≤ tx,n}, where Ξs
are balls centered in x such that
Ξ∞ = lim
s→∞Ξs
exists and is finite with probability one. We shall denote by Ext the filtration
just defined.
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The dynamics of σ is then completely specified by the updating rule
σtx,n(x) = ux,n.
Several remarks are in order: the reward ht(x) obtained by individual x as
a result of his decision at time t = tx,n is positive if the difference between
pleased and damaged friends is bigger than the difference between pleased
and damaged enemies, negative if the opposite happens, and zero if the value
is the same. Since at a fixed arrival time t = tx,n of the Poisson clock of x no
other clock is ringing, i.e. P(ty,m = t) = 0 for all y 6= x and for all m ∈ N,
the dynamics of σ is well-defined (also using the graphical construction).
Finally, at any positive time t, σt(x) represents the last decision taken by
individual x up to time t.
We formulate the following problem for the generic individual x: find a
strategy pix = (ux,1, ux,2, . . .) such that
ht(x) ≥ 0 a.s.
for all t ≥ Tx, where Tx is a finite (random) time.
Remark 1. We built the random graph G on the two-dimensional lattice
Z2 to give a “geographic” dimension to the problem and to have a simple
notion of distance on the graph. However, all results in the next section
still hold replacing Z2 with any higher dimensional lattice Zd, d ≥ 3. We
shall see below that choosing d = 2 also affects a constant appearing in an
assumption used to prove spatial mixing.
3. Admissible strategies that eliminate losses
In this section we construct explicitly a strategy pix for the generic in-
dividual x that asymptotically eliminate negative rewards, i.e. such that
P(ht(x) ≥ 0) = 1 for all t greater than a random time, which is finite with
probability one. It will also be clear that this strategy is non-cooperative,
that is pix eventually eliminate negative rewards irrespectively of the strate-
gies adopted by all other individuals.
For simplicity of notation let us describe the strategy pi ≡ pi0 for the
individual located at the origin O. The arrival times of his Poisson process
and the corresponding decisions and rewards will be denoted by tn, un, and
hn, n ∈ N, respectively.
The strategy pi = (u1, u2, . . .) is best defined algorithmically through a
decision tree. We also need an additional “data structure”, i.e. a collection
R of ordered triples of the type (η, u, h), where η ∈ S is supported on finite
balls, u ∈ {−1,+1}, and h ∈ {−1, 0,+1}.
At the first arrival time t1, u1 is chosen accordingly to a Bernoulli law
with parameter 1/2 (a “fair coin toss”), and (σΛ1 , u1, h1) is added to R.
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The description of the algorithm then follows inductively: at time tn+1,
let ΛMn be the support of the last configuration added to R. Let σ′ :=
σΛMn (tn+1−) and check whether there exists (σ′, u′, h′) ∈ R.
• If yes, set
un+1 = u′
h′
|h′| ,
with the convention 0/|0| := 1. The reward hn+1 corresponding to
un+1 is now obtained.
– If hn+1 ≥ 0, no further action is needed.
– If hn+1 < 0, then add to R the triplet (σΛMn+1 , un+1, hn+1).• Otherwise, set un+1 = un, and add toR the triplet (σ′, un+1, hn+1).
The above algorithm formalizes the following heuristic procedure: the agent
starts looking at the configuration on the smallest ball centered around him
and plays tossing a coin. The next time his clock rings, he checks whether
he has already seen such a configuration. If it is a new one, he will again
memorize it and play by tossing a coin, while if it is a known one he will play
as he did before if he got a positive reward, or the opposite way if he got
a negative reward. Of course it could happen that this way of playing still
does not guarantee a positive reward, in which case he will memorize the
configuration on a larger ball around himself and its associated outcome.
Remark 2. One of the key steps of the algorithm requires one to look for a
triplet (σ′, u′, h′) in R, given σ′ = σΛ, for a certain Λ ⊂ Z2. This operation
is uniquely determined, i.e. there can exist only one triplet (σ′, u′, h′) ∈ R
with a given σ′. This can be seen as a consequence of the structure of the
algorithm itself. Namely, as soon as the player “observes” the same config-
uration σ′ = σΛ with a different associated outcome h, he will immediately
enlarge the support of observed configurations Λ.
We shall now prove that the strategy just defined eliminates losses for
large times.
Theorem 1. For any individual x there exists a random time Tx, finite
with probability one, such that
P
(
ht∨Tx(x) ≥ 0
)
= 1.
Proof. Let us define a sequence of random times (τn)n∈N as follows:
τn = inf{n ∈ N | ∃(σ, u, h) ∈ R, suppσ = Λn+1},
with the convention that inf ∅ = +∞. In other words, τn is the first time
that individual x includes into his information set R the box Λn+1 (and if
this never happens, then τn = +∞). Let τk be the last finite element of the
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sequence (τn)n∈N. By assumption (2) we know that |{y : {x, y} ∈ E}| is
finite, hence k ≤ ρx because ht(x) only depends on those y linked to x, for
all times t. Therefore the biggest Λn observed by the agent in the origin is
finite.
Define the family of sets
Ak(t) = {σΛk(tx,`) : tx,` ∈ [τk, t]} .
It clearly holds Ak(t1) ⊆ Ak(t2) for t1 < t2, hence we can define
Ak(∞) = lim
t↑∞
Ak(t).
Since Ak(t) ⊂ {−1,+1}Λk , and Λk is finite, then there exists Tx > 0 such
that Ak(Tx) = Ak(∞), hence
Ak(t) = Ak(∞) ∀t > Tx.
We claim that hx,n ≥ 0 for all tx,n > Tx. In fact, for every tx,n > Tx there
exists (σ, u, h) ∈ R with σ(y) = σtx,n(y) for all y ∈ Λk. But since τk+1 =∞,
the algorithm will give as output a un such that hn ≥ 0 (to convince oneself
it is enough to “run” the algorithm). In a more suggestive way, one could
say that after Tx individual x has already been faced at least once with all
possible configurations that are relevant for him, and therefore knows how
to take the right decision. 
Remark 3. (i) Note that the strategies of other individuals never enter into
the arguments used in the proof. Therefore individual x is sure to reach
the goal of eliminating losses in finite time irrespectively of the strategies
played by all other individuals.
(ii) However, we would like to stress that the random time Tx is not
a stopping time (i.e. it is not adapted to the filtration Ext ). In fact, Tx
depends in general on the decisions of other individuals, whose policies are
not necessarily adapted to Ext . In general, even if all policies were adapted,
the random times {Tx}x∈Z2 would not be stopping times.
(iii) Let us also observe that although we formally allowed the strategy
pix to be adapted to Ext , the information used by the strategy constructed
in the proof of Theorem 1 is much smaller. Similarly, one could refine the
way the memory structure R is constructed, for instance by eliminating
configurations on smaller balls, when one starts to add new configurations
on balls of higher radius. However, we preferred to keep the construction of
R as it is to avoid non-essential complications.
As a consequence of theorem 1 and of observation (i) in the above remark,
one has the following result, which essentially states that the games admits
an “asymptotic” Nash equilibrium.
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Proposition 1. Let M ∈ N and assume that each player x ∈ ΛM :=
[−M,M ]× [−M,M ] adopts the strategy pix defined above. Then there exists
a finite random time TM after which no agent can gain by any change in
their strategy given the strategies currently pursued by other players.
It is important to observe that in the above proposition we implicitly
assume that each player only cares about “not loosing”, or equivalently he
distinguishes only between “loosing” (ht(x) < 0) and “not loosing” (ht(x) ≥
0). In this sense, after TM , there is no point for any player x ∈ ΛM to change
his strategy, as proved in theorem 1. The statement of the proposition is in
general false if the player distinguishes between ht(x) > 0, ht(x) = 0, and
ht(x) < 0.
We think that one can prove (and we leave it as a conjecture), that this
asymptotic equilibrium is not Pareto. This could be done adapting ideas of
O. Ha¨ggstro¨m [9], who proved that zero-temperature dynamics on a random
graph does not reach the minimum energy configuration.
4. Spatial mixing and ergodicity
The main result of this section, which plays an essential role in the results
about fixation of the next section, is that a spatial mixing property holds.
We shall work under the following hypothesis, which states that the prob-
ability of two agents being linked decays algebraically with their distance.
Standing assumption. It holds that
(3) P({x, y} ∈ E) ≤ C
d(x, y)9
,
for all y such that d(x, y) > 1, where C is a positive constant.
Note that assumption (3) implies (2). Moreover, the exponent appearing
on the right-hand side of (3) depends on the dimension of the lattice and
it is needed in order to use well-known combinatorial estimates on path
counting in Z2 in the proofs to follow. However, it would not be difficult
to generalize our arguments to any higher dimensional lattice Zd, d ≥ 3, at
the expense of replacing the exponent 9 with a (higher) constant depending
on the dimension d, and of using more complicated estimates in the proofs.
Since this point is not essential and would only add technical complications,
we preferred to fix d = 2.
Before stating the main theorem of this section, we need to introduce the
following set of conditions.
Hypothesis H. The process random graph G = (V,E) and the process
σ : [0,∞)→ {−1, 1}Z2 , satisfy the following conditions:
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(i) For each vertex x ∈ Z2 there exists a Poisson process Px, and the
Poisson processes {Px}x∈Z2 are mutually independent. Denoting by
Υx = {tx,n} the set of arrival times of Px, the value of σt(x) is
allowed to change only at times t ∈ Υx.
(ii) Given any couple (x, y) ∈ Z2 × Z2, the probability P({x, y} ∈ E) is
defined and it can depend on d(x, y). Moreover, for any choice of
(x, y), (v, w) ∈ Z2 × Z2 with (x, y) 6= (v, w), the events {x, y} ∈ E
and {v, w} ∈ E are mutually independent.
(iii) The evolution of the process is local, i.e. σtx,n(x) is measurable
with respect to Fxtx,n , where F
x
t denotes the σ-algebra generated by
{σs(y) : {x, y} ∈ E or y = x, s < t}. We denote by FVt the
σ-algebra generated by ∪x∈V Fxt .
(iv) Both the probability of two agents being linked and the evolution of σ
are translation invariant, i.e. P({x, y} ∈ E) = P({x+v, y+v} ∈ E)
and P(σt ∈ A|σ0 = η) = P(σt ∈ A+ v|σ0(·) = η(·+ v)).
We can now state the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 2. If Hypothesis H holds true, then σ satisfies the spatial mixing
property
(4) lim
Λ→Z2
P
(
σΛ0(t) = η|FΛ
c
t
)
= P(σΛ0(t) = η),
where Λ0 is any finite region in Z2.
Note that the process σ is translation invariant if each agent adopts the
same strategy at each decision time (the strategy does not need to be the one
defined in section 3). Before giving the proof of the theorem, we establish
some auxiliary results.
We shall use the following terminology: by “box of side length L” we
mean the set [−L/2, L/2]2 ⊂ Z2. For ρ < 1, we call “subbox of side length
Lρ” any one of the L1−ρ square sets into which a box of side length L can
be subdivided. We always assume Lρ, L1−ρ ∈ N (without loss of generality,
as it will be clear). Furthermore, we shall say that two subboxes R and S
are “neighbors” if d(R,S) ≤ √2, so every subbox has 8 neighbor subboxes.
We shall call “path of subboxes” a sequence of subboxes (Rk)k=1,...,K such
that Rk and Rk+1 are neighbors for each k = 1, . . . ,K − 1. Two subboxes
R, S are “linked” if there exist x ∈ R, y ∈ S such that {x, y} ∈ E.
In the following lemma we introduce a sequence of boxes increasing to
Z2, each of one further subdivided into a variable number of boxes also
increasing to Z2, but at a lower rate.
Lemma 1. There exist a sequence of integer numbers Ln ↑ +∞, a sequence
of square boxes QLn of side length Ln, each of them partitioned into subboxes
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of side Lρn, ρ = 13/42, such that only a finite number of the boxes QLn will
contain linked non-neighbor subboxes.
Proof. We use a Borel-Cantelli argument on a suitable sequence of box side
lengths Ln. In particular, let L be a positive integer, QL a square of side
L, subdivided into subboxes of side Lρ. The probability of an agent x to be
linked with some other agent of a non-neighbor subbox is bounded by∑
y:d(x,y)≥Lρ
C
d(x, y)9
≤ C1
∫ ∞
Lρ
1
v9
2piv dv = C2
1
L7ρ
,
where C, C1, C2 are positive constants. Therefore two agents in non-
neighbor subboxes exist with probability not larger than
L2
∑
y:d(x,y)≥Lρ
C
d(x, y)9
≤ C2 1
L7ρ−2
→ 0, as L→∞.
Taking now a subsequence Ln growing to infinity rapidly enough,∑
P(ALn) <∞,
where ALn denotes the event that QLn contains linked non-neighbor sub-
boxes. By Borel-Cantelli lemma, only a finite number of occurrences of ALn
can happen, which finishes the proof. 
Recall that for a sequence of i.i.d. standard exponential random variables
{Xi} one has
(5) P
( n∑
i=1
Xi < nα
)
≤ e−Φ(α)n ∀α < EX1,
where the so-called rate function Φ is given by
Φ(α) = α− 1− logα.
Proof of Theorem 2. We use a coupling argument to show that
(6) sup
ζ′,ζ′′
|P(σΛ0(t) = η|σΛc(0) = ζ ′)− P(σΛ0(t) = η|σΛc(0) = ζ ′′)| → 0
and hence, by the inequality
sup
ζ′,ζ′′
|P(σΛ0(t) = η|σΛc(0) = ζ ′)− P(σΛ0(t) = η|σΛc(0) = ζ ′′)|
≥ |P(σΛ0(t) = η|σΛc(0) = ζ)− P(σΛ0(t) = η)| ∀ζ,
that (4) holds.
We construct two coupled systems σ′, σ′′ on the same probability space
supporting σ in the following way: σ′x(0) = σ
′′
x(0) = σx(0) for all x ∈ Λ; σ′
and σ′′ update their state according to the same translation-invariant rule
of σ; all other randomness in the system (the random graph, the Poisson
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processes, the “coin tosses” needed for the decision rules) coincide. Define,
for any x ∈ V , the random time
τx = inf{t ≥ 0 : σ′x(t) 6= σ′′x(t)},
and introduce the process
[0,∞)× V 3 (t, x) 7→ νx(t) = 1(t ≥ τx) ∈ {0, 1}.
Using a pictorial language, we shall say that we color x with black as soon
as the two processes σ′ and σ′′ differ at x. Let us also introduce another
process ν˜ : [0,∞) × V → {0, 1} with the property ν˜x(t) ≥ νx(t) a.s. for
all x and all t. The dynamics of ν˜ is specified as follows: ν˜x(0) = 0 for all
x ∈ V , and ν˜x can turn to one as a consequence of two classes of events.
In particular, (i) ν˜x(t) = 1 if there exists x′ belonging to the same subbox
of x such that νx′(t) = 1, and (ii) ν˜x(τ) = 1 if there exists y belonging to
a neighbor subbox such that ν˜y(τ) = 1, where τ is any arrival time of the
Poisson process relative to x. Moreover, we assume that 1 is an absorbing
state for ν˜x, for all x. Using again a pictorial analogy, we could say that the
black area generated by ν˜ is bigger than the black area generated by ν. In
particular, as soon as a site x turns black, (i) implies that the whole subbox
to which it belongs becomes black as well.
By Lemma 1, there exists a positive integer N and a sequence Ln such
that for all n > N the boxes QLn contain no linked non-neighbor subboxes.
The shortest path of subboxes from the boundary of the box QLn to its
center has length L1−ρn /2 (therefore, for n large enough, the shortest path
of subboxes from the boundary of the box QLn to Λ0 has length greater or
equal than L1−ρn /2 − 1). Setting TQLρ = infx∈QLρ tx,1 (recall that tx,1 is
the first arrival time of the Poisson processes relative to x), one has that
the distribution of TQLρ is Exp(L
2ρ), where Exp(λ) stands for the law of
an exponential random variable with parameter λ. The minimum time for
the formation of a path of k “black” subboxes along a fixed path (of sites)
from the boundary of QLn to the origin is given by
T =
k∑
i=1
Ti
for all n > N (from now we shall tacitly assume n > N), where T1, . . . , Tk
are i.i.d. exponential random variables with parameter L2ρn (independence
and the value L2ρn follow by the memoryless property of the exponential
distribution).
Note that the sequence of subboxes in a path turning black does not
influence the minimum time needed for the formation of such path, which is
a sum of independent exponential random variables of parameter L2ρn , using
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again the memoryless property of exponential distributions. It follows by
(5) that, for 0 < α < 1, one has
P(T ≤ kαL−2ρn ) ≤ e−(α−1−logα)k.
Denoting by T∂QLn→O the (random) time needed to form a path of black
subboxes from the boundary of QLn to the origin O, we obtain the estimate
P
(
T∂QLn→O≤
α
2
L1−3ρn
)
≤ 4L1−ρn
∑
k≥L
1−ρ
n
2
8 · 7k−1 exp
(
−(α−1−logα)k
)
,
hence, for 0 < α < 17e ,
lim
n→∞P
(
T∂QLn→O ≤
α
2
L1−3ρn
)
= 0.
Here the term 4L1−ρn accounts for the possible initial subbox on the bound-
ary of QL, and 8 · 7k−1 is an upper bound for the number of paths (of sub-
boxes) of length k starting in a given subbox. We obtain that, as n → ∞,
the term on the right hand side goes to zero like e−βL
1−ρ
n (modulo polyno-
mial terms), with β a positive constant. Again by a Borel-Cantelli argument
we obtain
P
(
lim
L→∞
T∂QL→O =∞
)
= 1.
Moreover, the evolution of the central subbox is completely independent
on the configuration outside Λ until it turns black, and so the theorem is
proved. 
Remark 4. Although (6) has been proved only for a particular choice of
a sequence of increasing boxes Λn, one can easily show that any increasing
sequence of boxes will do. In fact, the supremum appearing in (6) is de-
creasing with respect to Λ, hence it is enough to prove the theorem for any
(fixed) subsequence.
5. Fixation
In this section we shall work under the general assumptions introduced
in section 2 and 4, and furthermore we assume that each player adopts
the same strategy (hence the dynamics is translation invariant), and that
interactions are symmetric, i.e. that j(x, y) = j(y, x) for any x, y ∈ V . The
latter hypothesis is essential, as it would be possible to find counterexamples
to our results in the case of asymmetric interactions. As before, we shall
denote by x an arbitrary agent, fixed throughout this section. Let us define
the random time Tx as
(7) Tx = sup{t : at time t agent x sees a new configuration or loses}.
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As it follows from Theorem 1, Tx is finite with probability one. Moreover,
by definition, agent x will not loose at any time after Tx. Let us also define
the random variable Mx as the number of times agent x changes his state
(i.e. updates his opinion) during the time interval (0,+∞).
The main result of this section is the following:
Theorem 3. Assume that each agent adopts the strategy constructed in
section 3. Then each agent x ∈ V updates his opinion only a finite number
of times, i.e.
P(Mx <∞) = 1.
Before proving theorem 3, we shall need some more definitions and prepa-
ratory results.
Let us recall the definition of ρx:
(8) ρx = sup
y: {x,y}∈E
d(x, y),
the distance from x of his farthest connected agent. Note that one has, as
follows by the standing assumption (3),
(9) P(ρx ≥ r) ≤
∑
s≥r
4s
C
s8+ε
≤ K
r6+ε
where C and K are constants depending on x. Therefore Eρkx, 1 ≤ k ≤ 5
are finite:
(10) Eρkx ≤ 1+
∞∑
r=2
rkP(ρ = r) ≤ 1+
∞∑
r=2
rkP(ρ ≥ r) ≤ 1+
∞∑
r=2
rk
K
r6+ε
<∞.
Let us also define the energy (or Lyapunov) function on a finite set Λ ⊂ Z2
as
(11) HΛ(σ) = −
∑
u∈Λ
h˜u(σ),
where
(12) h˜u(σ) =
∑
v:{u,v}∈E
j(u, v)σuσv.
In the following we shall denote by Λn the square box [−n, n]× [−n, n].
Lemma 2. There exists a continuous function e : R+ → [−Eρ2,Eρ2] such
that
(13) lim
n→∞
HΛn(σ(t))
|Λn| = e(t) a.s.
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Proof. By the definitions of h˜x(σ(t)), ρx, it follows that for each time t
−ρ2x ≤ h˜x(σ(t)) ≤ ρ2x,
hence, taking expectations, recalling (10), and using translation invariance
−∞ < −Eρ2O ≤ Eh˜x(σ(t)) ≤ Eρ2O <∞.
At any time t, using the space ergodicity of the system (implied by the
spatial mixing property proved in Theorem 2), we obtain
(14) lim
n→∞
HΛn(σ(t))
|Λn| = Eh˜O(σ(t)) a.s.
Setting e(t) = Eh˜O(σ(t)), we just have to prove that e is continuous. Using
again the spatial ergodicity of σ, the proportion of agents in Λn taking at
least a decision in the time interval ]t1, t2[ tends to 1 − e−(t2−t1) ≤ t2 − t1
as n → ∞. Since each agent is endowed with a Poisson process that is
independent from all other processes and random variables describing the
dynamics of the system, the mean energy variation of each agent is bounded
by Eρ2. Therefore we also have
(15)
|e(t2)− e(t1)| = lim
n→∞
|HΛn(σ(t2))−HΛn(σ(t1))|
|Λn|
≤ (1− e−(t2−t1))Eρ2 ≤ (t2 − t1)Eρ2,
i.e. the function e is Lipschitz continuous. 
Let us now define the following discrete random sets for agent x, which
are subsets of the set of arrival times of his Poisson process:
N1(x) =
= {t : t≤Tx, the agent in x sees a known configuration at time t and loses}
N2(x) =
= {t : t ≤ Tx, there is an arrival of the Poisson process in x} \N1(x)
N3(x) = {t : t > Tx, the agent in x changes opinion}
Note that by definition of Tx, at any time t > Tx agent x can only see
known configurations, and can only win.
We also define, for every t > 0 and x ∈ Z2, the random sets
Ni(t, x) = Ni(x) ∩ [0, t],
for i = 1, 2, 3.
Moreover, for Λ ⊂ Z2, we set
Ni(t,Λ) =
⋃
x∈Λ
Ni(t, x).
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The dynamics of the system and the definition of e(t) imply that e(t) is
determined only by the changes of στ (·), τ ∈ {Ni(t, x)}x∈Z2 , i = 1, 2, 3. We
can therefore write
e(t) = e1(t) + e2(t) + e3(t),
where ei(t) denotes the component of e(t) determined by changes of στ (·) for
τ ∈ {Ni(t, x)}x∈Z2 . Moreover one has e2(t) ≤ 0 because we are eliminating
the arrivals where the agent lost, and in this case the energy can only
decrease.
We are now in the position to prove the theorem on the fixation of the
stochastic dynamics.
Proof of Theorem 3. In virtue of the translation invariance of the system,
it is enough to prove the result for the agent in the origin. First observe
that MO ≤ |N1(O)| + |N2(O)| + |N3(O)|, because N1(O) and N2(O) may
contain Poisson arrival times in which the agent O does not change his
opinion. Denoting Ni(O) by Ni for simplicity of notation, we shall prove
that |Ni| < ∞ almost surely for i = 1, 2, 3. Let us first observe that the
following inclusion relations hold:
{|N1(O)|+ |N2(O)| =∞} ⊂ {TO =∞} ∪ (
⋃
n≥1
{N1(O) =∞, TO < n}),
and
{|N1(O)|+ |N2(O)| =∞, TO < n} ⊂
{|Arrivals in (0, n) of the Poisson process in the origin| =∞, TO < n}.
Recalling that P({TO =∞}) = 0 we obtain
P (|N1(O)|+ |N2(O)| =∞) ≤
∞∑
n=1
P(|Arrivals in (0, n) of the Poisson process in the origin| =∞) = 0.
Thus we only need to show that |N3(O)| is almost surely finite. First we
observe that one has
e1(t) =(16)
= lim
n→∞
1
|Λn|
∑
τ∈N1(t,Λn)
HΛn(σ(τ))−HΛn(σ(τ−)) ≤ Eρ3O a.s.,
because the number of changes in the origin N1(t, O) is at most ρO (the
maximum number of enlargements of the box observed by the agent x), and
in any change the energy can increase at most by ρ2O. Finally, the spatial
ergodicity yields the almost sure upper bound in (16).
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At any time τ ∈ N3 the energy HΛ(σ(t)) decreases at least of one unit, i.e.
HΛ(σ(t)) ≤ HΛ(σ(t−)) − 1, otherwise the agent does not change opinion.
Thus
(17)
e3(t) = lim
n→∞
1
|Λn|
∑
τ∈N3(t,Λn)
HΛn(σ(τ))−HΛn(σ(τ−))
≤ lim
n→∞
−|N3(t,Λn)|
|Λn| = −E|N3(t, O)|,
where we have used once more the spatial ergodicity.
By Lemma 2 and noting that the energy is initially zero (because agents
choose +1 or −1 with probability 1/2), one has the following inequality
−Eρ2 ≤ e(t) = e1(t) + e2(t) + e3(t) ≤ e1(t) + e3(t),
which holds uniformly in time t. Using inequalities (16) and (17) we obtain
E|N3(t, O)| ≤ Eρ3O + Eρ2O ≤ ∞ uniformly in t, hence also in the limit as
t → ∞. But E|N3(O)| < ∞ obviously implies |N3(O)| < ∞ a.s., so we
have shown that MO ≤ |N1(O)|+ |N2(O)|+ |N3(O)| <∞ and the proof is
complete. 
Remark 5. We can also deduce, following the proof of Theorem 3, that
P (N3 > C) ≤ E(ρ
2
O) + E(ρ
3
O)
C
,
as an immediate consequence of Markov’s inequality.
Remark 6. Let us briefly comment on the connection between the fixa-
tion result just proved and the results of De Santis and Newman [3]. The
improvement is twofold: namely, the dynamics considered here does not co-
incide (locally) with zero-temperature dynamics. It is immediate to prove
that at any given time there is at least an agent which does not follow
the zero-temperature dynamics. This implies that on any time interval the
zero-temperature dynamics and our dynamics are almost surely different.
Our could say, perhaps somewhat informally, that our dynamics is a per-
turbation of zero-temperature dynamics with the property of preserving
fixation. Moreover, as already mentioned several times, our dynamics is
non-Markovian, while the arguments used in [3] hold only for Markovian
dynamics.
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